Anaesthesia in Australia is amongst the safest in the world. This record of safety is under threat from increasing pressures to operate at times of poor human performance, particularly late at night. Our institution has a policy mandating the prioritisation of surgery based on clinical need while minimising the risks associated with afterhours surgery. The policy states that "only Category 1 (urgent, needing immediate surgery) and Category 2 cases which cannot wait until the morning should be done between 2230 and 0800". From 5 March 2007 we performed an eight-week prospective audit of all cases where surgery occurred in this time period. The anaesthetic senior registrar on duty recorded the clinical priority of the case. There were 95 cases commenced between 2230 and 0800 hours during the audit period, of which 28 (30%) were in clear breach of this policy, in some cases delaying urgent surgery. The potential implications of such breaches are significant in the context of worse outcomes for patients undergoing surgery in the after-hours period. When non-urgent cases occupy resources, the capacity of the system to deal with the truly urgent case is significantly impaired.
There has been recent focus in Australia on the structure and timing of surgery 1 . This reflects an increased demand on operating theatre resources due to larger numbers of older patients with increasingly complex comorbidities. Implementations of strategies to address this demand have included expansion of day-case surgery and shorter inpatient stays, coupled with minimally invasive surgical techniques. While these measures have been partially effective, hospitals are now often running at, or at times over, capacity 2, 3 . This has produced an inevitable trend towards increased nocturnal operating activity, or so-called 'out-of-hours' surgery 1, 4 .
These pressures have led to the development of emergency surgery guidelines in New South Wales 4 . The focus of these guidelines is to plan for predictable emergency workload; scheduling nonelective surgery in 'standard hours' where clinically appropriate. This document also highlights the patient, staff and management (cost) benefits of this approach.
Anaesthesia in Australia is very safe with a probable rate of anaesthetic-related deaths of less than one in 50,000 5 . Morbidity is much harder to quantify, but an awareness of the impact of physician fatigue on adverse patient outcomes supports the NSW rethink about the necessity of operating 'outof-hours'.
The only published data quantifying after-hours operating practices come from the United Kingdom. The National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death produced publications called Who Operates When and Who Operates When 2 6, 7 . Following the recommendations of Who Operates When, significant changes in the patterns of afterhours work occurred in the United Kingdom 7 . Increased resource allocation and the funding of day-time emergency theatres led to a reduction in surgery conducted at night in the United Kingdom.
Even with guidelines in place and a recognition of the benefits of 'standard hours' scheduling of emergency operating, there can be pressure to operate at night. Information relating to local practices regarding night-time operating has not been reported in the literature. In light of this, data were obtained delineating current practices at our hospital, especially related to the appropriateness of the surgical cases performed after-hours as determined by divisional policy.
METHODS
A prospective audit of 'after-hours', non-elective operating theatre usage during an eight-week period in March and April 2007 was conducted. The audit was registered with the institutional Quality Assurance authority. Royal Perth Hospital is a 600bed tertiary referral centre in Western Australia and is the state trauma centre, dealing with a significant non-elective surgical workload. There is on-site staffing for emergency theatres 24 hours a day, but between 2230 and 0800 hours staffing levels are only sufficient for a single theatre. Off-site staff is available to permit opening of extra theatres if required.
The division of surgery (including the department of anaesthesia) has a policy for the booking of nonelective surgical cases, which classifies such cases as:
Category 1 -True emergency cases: patients who require immediate life-or limb-saving procedures.
Category 2 -Urgent cases: patients who require life-or limb-saving procedures that do not need to be performed immediately, but which should be performed as soon as possible.
Category 3 -Non-urgent cases: cases not life-or limb-threatening in the immediate 24-to 48-hour period, but which need to be performed outside a surgeon's allocated theatre session.
The divisional policy regarding theatre utilisation after 2230 hours is that "One theatre will normally operate after 2230 for Category 1 cases and those Category 2 cases that cannot be delayed until 0800".
Prior to the audit, anaesthetic staff were reminded of the divisional policy regarding the scheduling of non-elective cases, both through notification at weekly departmental meetings and written communication to the anaesthetic trainees. The senior anaesthetic registrar on overnight shift from 2030 to 0800 hours was asked to complete a questionnaire at the end of each shift. Data were collected about patient demographics; type of surgery, surgical urgency category and the respondent was asked whether he or she considered that the case had been operated on at an appropriate time. Data were complete for every night of the study period. The accuracy of time and duration of surgery was verified by cross-checking against the computerised theatre management system.
All cases commenced after 2230 hours, the time of lowest theatre staffing, were included in the audit. Cases documented by the senior anaesthetic registrar as being of surgical Category 2 and which 'could have waited until morning' and those classified as Category 3 were considered in breach of divisional policy and the medical notes were reviewed. This review was performed by two of the investigators in order to identify information to support the decision to not defer the case until the next morning. If the investigators could not reach a consensus on the appropriateness of the timing of the case, the case was considered to be compliant with the divisional policy. Cases reported as being Category 1 and Category 2 which could not have waited until the next morning were not reviewed and were assumed to have been operated on afterhours according to divisional policy. Data generated in the audit were compiled and sentinel cases were identified.
RESULTS
In all, 128 cases were documented during the audit period: 33 were excluded from the analysis for compliance with divisional policy because surgery started before 2230 hours, but all were included in the assessment of theatre time utilisation. There were thus 95 cases which commenced after the 2230 hours time demarcation. The demographic characteristics of these patients are shown in Table 1 .
The main emergency theatre was in use until 0130 hours during 33 of the 56 nights audited (59%). During three of the 56 nights (5%), a second theatre was open during the same hours in order to deal with emergency cases which could not wait ( Figure 1 ). Of the 95 cases starting between 2230 and 0800 hours ( Figure 2 ), 46 (48%) were classified as American Society of Anesthesiologists grade III to VI. Fifty percent of cases performed after-hours were general surgical cases.
The waiting times (median [quartiles]) for each booking category were 0.5 (0.2 to 1) hours for Category 1, 6.4 (2.5 to 12.6) hours for Category 2 and 11.5 (9.2 to 30) hours for Category 3 (Figure 3 ).
Of the 95 cases started after-hours (Table 1, Figure  2 ), 28 (29.5%) were assessed as patients who could have waited until daylight hours. These included three Category 3 cases and 25 Category 2 cases. The cases identified as 'could have waited until morning' were predominantly suspected appendicitis, incision and drainage of abscesses and wound washouts.
Four Category 1 cases waited longer than 2.5 hours and on three of these four occasions the Category 1 case was delayed by Category 2 cases that were assessed as 'could have waited until morning'. These Category 2 cases delaying the urgent Category 1 cases included an ilio-popliteal bypass, a tendon and nerve repair of a hand and a finger washout. All three Category 3 patients were for hand plastic surgery, who had either been waiting for a long time or were being done to create capacity the next day. 
DISCUSSION
The most important finding of this audit is that in a unit with a clearly defined policy in relation to outof-hours working practice, regular breaches occurred and on a number of occasions, these breaches resulted in delays in the initiation of surgery on urgent Category 1 cases. We did not investigate the causes of these breaches, nor was it possible to quantify the adverse effects. This clearly is work which will need to be done, given the available evidence describing the adverse effects of delaying urgent surgery 8, 9 .
The factors which may increase the risks of performing surgery out-of-hours related to the effects of fatigue on anaesthesia and surgical practice, and the levels of ward staffing at night. Two inter-related factors contribute to fatigue, namely the absolute number of hours awake and circadian effects.
The detrimental effects of fatigue have been clearly demonstrated in the transport and general working populations 10, 11 . It has been 10 years since the effects of fatigue on psychomotor performance were equated to blood alcohol concentrations. After 17 hours awake, psychomotor performance has been correlated with a blood alcohol level of 0.05 g/dl and 24 hours of wakefulness to 0.10 g/dl 12 . There is also evidence of the association between prolonged exposure to shift work and cardiovascular disease 13, 14 . The detrimental effects of fatigue and shift work on individual health and performance may translate into an increase in adverse occupational outcomes. There are recommendations for safe occupational hours 15 and safe rostering practices for doctors in general and anaesthetists in particular. These can address the fatigue component of 'out-of-hours' practice but do not account for the circadian effects on shift workers. With good rostering practices, the performance impairment of anaesthetists can be minimised but not eliminated.
There are increased anaesthetic risks associated with operating at night. Fatigue has been implicated in iatrogenic adverse patient outcomes in anaesthesia 16 and in other industries with 'fatiguecritical' tasks 17 . Many surveys have noted that more than 50% of anaesthetists and nurse anaesthetists report making errors in the administration of anaesthesia as a result of fatigue [18] [19] [20] . The circadian contributor to fatigue is unavoidable, although peak night-time circadian-related lulls in performance fall between 0200 and 0600 hours 17 . Data from the Australian Incident Monitoring Study points to an association between 'syringe swap' medication errors and circadian-related fatigue 16 . The risk of accidental dural puncture during epidural insertion has also been found to be higher between 0000 and 0800 hours 21 . Needlestick injuries are also more likely at night 22 .
There are also good operative reasons to defer unnecessary out-of-hours surgery. An analysis of selected orthopaedic outcomes in a Boston hospital, before and after the introduction of a dedicated daytime trauma theatre, found that surgical duration was longer and complication rates for the two common operations reviewed (dynamic hip screw and insertion of femoral nail) were higher when these surgeries were performed at night 23 .
Ward staffing at night is significantly reduced compared to daylight hours, providing for less nursing time available per patient. Intensive care unit discharges to wards at night are associated with an increase in-hospital mortality 24 . In one study, peak rates of mortality and intensive care unit readmission were seen in patients discharged between 0300 and 0400 hours, the time of the peak circadian lull 25 . Further research is needed to determine whether discharge to the ward from a recovery area postoperatively confers similar risks.
The direct impact on patient care of limited theatre resources at night was revealed by this audit. On at least three occasions in the eight-week period, patients classified as Category 1 -true emergency cases, needing to be done as soon as possiblewere kept waiting because the main theatre was occupied by a case that could have waited until the next morning. This is particularly concerning as these Category 1 cases are the 'true emergency cases' -patients who require life-saving surgery. Although the detection of adverse outcomes was not within the scope of the audit, any delay to a true emergency can be potentially catastrophic. This potential must be weighed against the conflicting literature about the potential harm of delaying less urgent cases (i.e. appendicectomy) 26, 27 .
Despite the increased risk and complications of after-hours surgery and a clearly defined policy supporting not operating unnecessarily, nearly a third of cases in this audit were operated on inappropriately. The reasons for this were not directly recorded within the audit, but the long waiting times for some Category 2 and 3 patients provides a telling insight. It seems that a lack of theatre resources, time, surgeons or anaesthetists creates much of the pressure to operate in suboptimal conditions after-hours.
The 'out-of-hours' surgical urgency must be weighed against the attendant risk of medical error attributable to performance decrement 7 . Operating theatre management committees should implement measures to keep night-time surgery to a minimum. This can be done by clearly outlining policy on which cases are appropriate to do after-hours and then ensuring that policy breaches (30% of the time in this audit) are kept to a minimum. A purpose-designed study to identify the forces driving these breaches in policy and the safety implications thereof needs to be undertaken.
The increasing demand on operating theatre resources has inevitably resulted in more out-ofhours surgery. Operating at night, a 'fatigue-critical' task, is a potential hazard, with risks for both patients and staff. The most effective risk control measure is elimination of unnecessary surgery. In this audit, 30% of surgical procedures conducted after-hours were considered by the anaesthetist to be potentially avoidable, and the possibility that patient safety would have been enhanced by operating in-hours during the next day. It may be appropriate for professional organisations to address the increased risk to both patient and clinician resulting from inappropriate out of hours work. Guidelines in this context would underscore the primacy of patient safety.
